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Introduction

I.

Prompted by their perception that significant civil litigation
misconduct involving frivolous papers was occurring in federal trial

Professor of Law, Northern Illinois University. B.A. 1970, Colby College;
J.D. 1974, The University of Chicago. An earlier version of this Article was
presented on June 17, 1994, at the Annual Meeting of the Law and Society
*

Association.
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courts,1 the federal rulemakers first effected a major overhaul of
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1983.2

changes in the Rule, which had lain dormant since

1938, 3

The

greatly

expanded the circumstances under which sanctions for frivolous
papers might be imposed. 4 The changes led to "a cottage industry

1. Professor Arthur R. Miller has said the following about the 1983 Rule's
amendments:
There is a widespread feeling that there is a lot of frivolous conduct
on the part of lawyers out there, a lot of vexatious conduct, a lot of
inefficient conduct .... I repeat, we do not know how much of this there
really is, because what one person would call frivolous, somebody else
would call meaningful or substantive. We may be the victims of the
phenomenon known as the cosmic anecdote: Somebody tells a war story at
one bar association meeting, and it is picked up by ten other lawyers who
then tell the same anecdote at ten other bar association meetings, and
before you know it people are rioting in the streets saying the foundations
of the republic are crumbling, because this incident, which has only
happened once, now appears to have happened a thousand times. We
really don't know, but the advisory committee. .. felt that there had to be
some meaningful restraint put on lawyer behavior to cut out some of this
type of conduct.
ARTHUR R. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER

RESPONSIBILITY 11-12 (1984).

2. For a comparison of the 1983 Rule to its 1938 predecessor, see Supreme Court
of the United States, Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D.
165, 196-97 (1983) [hereinafter 1983 Amendments to the FederalRules] (highlighting
the differences between the 1938 and 1983 rules).
3. On the operation of the 1938 Rule, see D. Michael Risinger, Honesty in
Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some 'Striking' Problems With FederalRule of Civil
Procedure11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 5 (1976) (examining the historical development
of Rule 11 as well as the inconsistency between the obligations the Rule imposes and
the mechanism it provides for enforcement).
4. For an early view on this expansion, see Jeffrey A. Parness, Groundless
Pleadings and Certifying Attorneys in the Federal Courts, 1985 UTAH L. REV. 325,
327-37 (describing the courts' numerous options for justifying the imposition of
sanctions against attorneys for frivolous papers). For an account of the experience
under the 1983 Rule, see Arthur R. Miller, The New Certification Standard Under
Rule 11, 130 F.R.D. 479, 479-81 (1990) (illustrating the effect of Rule 11 on federal
court practice).
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of routine sanctions motions" for litigators5 and to "a cottage

industry of writing about Rule 11" for academicians. 6 One distin-

guished observer noted that the 1983 Rule had "an impact that has
likely exceeded its drafters' expectations." 7 Another found that the

rulemakers had undertaken "radical changes in direction" that
loosened unforeseen forces. 8

The Rule was again overhauled in 1993.

These most recent

amendments, founded on both anecdotal and empirical evidence
about the 1983 Rule,10 should dampen existing cottage industries.

But new industries may emerge, as once more the civil rulemakers
have undertaken radical changes in direction with unforeseen

consequences. One such change involves new institutional responsibilities for legal organizations, including private law firms, in-house

corporate legal departments, and public offices housing such officials

as attorneys general or agency commissioners.

examine those new loosened forces.

This Article will

5. Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospectsfor Procedural
Progress,59 BROOK. L. REv. 761, 796 (1993); see also Jerald Solovy et al., Curbing
Frivolity in the Courts: Updated Cure, NAT'L L.J., May 2, 1994, at A19 ("By 1986,
Rule 11 had outstripped the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act as
the cottage industry of the 1980s.").
6. Marcus, supra note 5, at 796.
7. William W. Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1013
(1988).
8. Marcus, supra note 5, at 800.
9. For a comparison of the 1983 and 1993 rules, as well as for the Advisory
Committee's Notes accompanying the 1993 Rule, see COMMUNICATION FROM THE
CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING AMENDMENTS TO THE

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FORMS PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. 2072,

H.R. Doe. No. 74, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993), reprintedin Supreme Court of the
United States, Amendments to the FederalRules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 402,
577-92 (1993) [hereinafter 1993 Amendments to the FederalRules].
10. For a review of some of the empirical data, see Marcus, supra note 5, at 79798. For an account of how the 1993 rulemakers gathered evidence, see Jeffrey A.
Parness, Fines UnderNew FederalCivilRule 11: The New Monetary Sanctionsfor the
'Stop-and-Think-Again' Rule, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 879, 883-84, 891-95 (discussing
the differences between the 1983 and 1993 amendments to Rule 11).
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II. Responsibilities of Legal Organizations under the New Rule 11:
More Radical Changes in Direction
Before December 1993, Rule 11 primarily addressed the

responsibilities of individuals signing litigation papers. Under the
1938 Rule, papers had to be signed by an attorney representing a
party or by an unrepresented party. Papers that were unsigned or
signed with "intent to defeat the purpose" of the Rule could be

stricken.' 2 The signature requirement helped ensure that the papers
were neither "sham" nor false and that the signer had determined
that there was "good ground" to support the allegations therein.' 3
An attorney who willfully violated the 1938 Rule could be "sub-

jected to appropriate disciplinary action."

4

Under the 1983 Rule, the signature of an attorney or of an
unrepresented party helped ensure that a paper filed with the court

was "well grounded in fact" and was not "interposed for any
improper purpose."

5

A violation of Rule 11 would lead to a

mandatory sanction on the signer, the represented party, or both.' 6
Any sanction had to be "appropriate" and frequently involved "an
order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the . . . paper,
including a reasonable attorney's fee."' 7

The 1993 Rule maintains a signature requirement" but broadens the requirement's coverage to not only all who sign, but also to
all who file, submit, or later advocate frivolous papers. It specifi-

11. 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules, supra note 2, at 196 ("Every
pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney
of record in his individual name ....
A party who is not represented by an attorney
shall sign his pleading .. .
12. Id. at 197.
13. Id.
14. Id. Apparently, under the 1938 Rule, the only form of nonwillful violation
that might have subjected an attorney to appropriate disciplinary action was the
insertion of "scandalous or indecent matter." Id.
15. Id.
16. 1983 Amendments to the FederalRules, supra note 2, at 196 ("If a... paper
is signed in violation of this rule, the court . . . shall impose upon the person who
signed it, a represented party, or both, an appropriate sanction .... ").
17. Id.
18. FED. R. Crw. P. 11(a) ("Every . . . paper shall be signed by at least one
attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is not represented
by an attorney, shall be signed by the party.").
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cally permits the sanctioning of "law firms" that "present" frivolous
papers or that are responsible for the presentation of frivolous papers
on behalf of others. 19 Additionally, the Rule expressly recognizes
that law firms, "absent exceptional circumstances," will be held
jointly responsible for "violations committed by its partners,
associates and employees. "2 Finally, the Rule permits trial judges
to take "initiative" against "an attorney, law firm, or party"
regarding frivolous papers."
The legislative history accompanying the 1993 Rule goes further
in broadening the coverage by recognizing that in "unusual circumstances" an attorney presenting a frivolous paper may escape
sanction altogether; in such circumstances, a court would impose a
sanction only upon those who "caused" the violation, including
attorneys in the presenter's law firm, co-counsel, attorneys from
different law firms, or the party.22 The Committee's Notes state
that exemplary settings are those where "governmental agencies or
other institutional parties . . . impose substantial restrictions on the
discretion of individual attorneys employed by [them]. " I
Thus, the 1993 Rule clearly recognizes that a private law firm
may be sanctioned for causing the presentation of a frivolous paper
signed by one of its attorneys. To more fully promote the deterrence rationale underlying this Rule, law firms should be held
accountable not only for certain vicarious liability, but also for
failure to adequately supervise. These vicarious and supervisory
duties constitute radical changes in direction. Under the 1983 Rule,
the United States Supreme Court held that a law firm could not be
sanctioned for a frivolous complaint signed by one of its attorneys.24 That holding has been overruled by the 1993 amendment.
Some have read the 1993 amendments as based on the rulemakers'
view that litigation standards will be enhanced because "the

19. Id. 11(c).
21. Id. 11(c)(1)(B).

20. Id. 11(c)(1)(A).

22. Id. 11 Advisory Committee's Notes.
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee's Notes.
24. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 U.S. 120, 125
(1989).
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possibility of law firm liability would create incentives for internal
monitoring" within law firms.25
However dramatic these changes, the 1993 rulemakers said little
else about when law firms might be sanctioned for causing Rule 11
violations. 26 For example, while the rulemakers listed "a variety
of possible sanctions" against individuals available to the trial
court,27 they failed to speak much about sanctions against legal
organizations. The new Rule itself states that a "sanction may
consist of, or include, directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order
to pay a penalty into court, or ... an order directing payment...

of some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses
incurred as a direct result of the violation." 2 The accompanying
legislative history acknowledges the availability of sanctions such as
"striking the offending paper; issuing an admonition, reprimand, or
censure; requiring participation in seminars or other educational
programs; ordering a fine payable to the court; referring the matter
to disciplinary authorities (or, in the case of government attorneys,
to the Attorney General, Inspector General, or agency head). "29
Thus, forces are now loose that permit federal trial judges to
sanction private law firms and perhaps other legal organizations
under Rule 11. But little direction or explanation has been given by
the rulemakers; therefore, consequences are unforeseen and
potentially uncontemplated. An examination of these forces and
consequences is vital in order to awaken entrepreneurs of new
cottage industries. More importantly, an examination is necessary
because the new Rule 11 forces have been loosened precisely at a
25. The Committee on Professional Responsibility of the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York, Discipline ofLaw Firms, 48 REc. Ass'N B. CITY N.Y. 628,
636 n.8 (1993) [hereinafter Discipline of Law Firms].
26. Furthermore, little was said of law firm liability for Rule 11 sanctions in the
correspondence of interested persons forwarded to the federal rulemakers between
1990 and 1993. With the much appreciated assistance of the federal rulemakers' staff,
the author reviewed the 1993 Rule 11 file on May 13, 1993, in Washington, D.C.
It should be noted, however, that the Chicago Bar Association endorsed a new form
of sanction in 1990, requiring that law firms "institute internal approval procedures
to assure" future compliance with signature rules. Comment from The Chicago Bar
Association to the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the U.S. Judicial
Conference (Nov. 2, 1990) (on file with The Review of Litigation).
27. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee's Notes.
28. Id.11(c)(2).
29. Id.11 Advisory Committee's Notes.
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time when the topic of sanctioning legal organizations has been
raised through lively debate elsewhere; study of the new Rule may
inform those debates.
Approximately six months before the 1993 Rule took effect, the

Committee on Professional Responsibility of the Association of the
Bar of the City of New York issued a report recommending that the'
attorney disciplinary rules be amended to provide for the discipline

of law firms, including both "specific standards of conduct for law
firms and procedures for disciplining law firms." 30

The purpose

of the proposed amendment was to prompt law firms to find new
ways to avoid civil and other liability for themselves and their
members by improving firm-wide practices and procedures.31

Thus, the aim was comparable to the enunciated goal of the new
Rule 11, which was "to deter repetition" of the sanctioned "conduct

or comparable conduct by others similarly situated., 32 The New
York Bar report noted that its aim paralleled the goals recently
pursued in tort-law liability and in administrative-agency sanctions.

33

Like the 1993 Rule, the New York Bar Association deems
"policies on signing pleadings" to be "the responsibility of the entire

firm," not just of a supervising or signing attorney.34 Thus, the
association recommends that law firms be required to provide

adequate supervision of the legal work of all partners, associates,

and nonlawyers, with adequacy gauged by the "reasonable under the
30. Discipline of Ltnv Firms, supra note 25, at 629.
31. Id.
32. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
33. Discipline of Law Firms, supra note 25, at 628; see also Ted Schneyer,
ProfessionalDisciplinefor Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1991) [hereinafter
Schneyer, ProfessionalDisciplinefor Law Firms?] (comparing professional discipline
of law firms to emerging corporate criminal liability principles); Ted Schneyer, From
Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism:What the S &L Crisis Portendsfor the Regulation
of Banking, 35 S. TEX. L. REv. 639 (1994) (discussing the use of administrative
enforcement actions as opposed to state disciplinary proceedings in response to the
alleged failures of many savings-and-loan lawyers).
34. Discipline ofLaw Firms, supra note 25, at 631. An example of a supervising
lawyer's responsibility for the pleadings signed by others is found in Illinois Rules of
Professional Conduct: "Each partner in a law firm shall make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the firm has in effect measures giving reasonable assurance that the
conduct of all lawyers in the firm conforms to these Rules." ILL. R. CT., ART. VIII,
R. 5.1.
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circumstances" standard. 5 Relevant circumstances include "the
experience of the person whose work is being supervised" and "the
36
likelihood that ethical questions might arise."
III. Directing Loosened Forces: Legal Organizations,
Adequate Supervision, and Appropriate Sanctions
In exploring the unforeseen consequences of organizational
duties under the new Rule 11, three issues emerge: (1) What, if any,
legal organizations beside private law firms are subject to possible
sanction? (2) What constitutes adequate supervision by a legal
organization of its attorneys who present papers? and, (3) Beyond
the usual vicarious liability for monetary directives against their
attorneys, what other sanctions may be "appropriate" for legal
organizations? Exploration should inform not only those responsible
for compliance or enforcement of the Rule, but also those debating
the extension of lawyer discipline codes and the like to legal
organizations.
A. Legal Organizations
While the new Rule 11 and its legislative history expressly
recognize institutional responsibilities only for "law firms," 37 the
inherent deterrence rationale 38 also seemingly applies to other legal
organizations, including in-house corporate law offices and govern-

35. Discipline of Law Firms, supra note 25, at 638.
36. Id.
37. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c). The federal rulemakers did not define what
constitutes a law firm. Typically, a firm may be a sole proprietorship, a professional
service corporation, a professional association, or a limited liability company. See,
e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 721 (stating that law firms may be formed as professional
corporations or more informal associations). The New York Bar Association approach
seems suitable for the new Rule 11: "[Ihe definition of a law firm, for disciplinary
purposes, should depend on whether a group of lawyers hold themselves out to the
public as practicing together." Discipline of Law Finns, supra note 25, at 642.
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
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mental law offices.39 Possible sanctions against such entities would

"create incentives for internal monitoring, " 4 and this monitoring
could be judicially reviewed for adequacy under a standard of
"reasonable under the circumstances." 4 1 Moreover, there is little
sense in deeming "policies" regarding the signing of litigation papers

to be "the responsibility" of an entire private law firm42 and then

waiving such responsibility for the law offices of private corporations or public agencies. Neither the federal rulemakers nor the

New York City Bar Association found that private law firms were

more likely to be unreasonable or otherwise unprofessional in

presenting litigation papers than other legal organizations. Thus, the
new Rule should be read broadly to subject varying forms of legal

organizations to possible sanction.43

Incidentally, even if the reach of the new Rule is read to exclude
legal organizations other than law firms, other entities may still be

subject to "the inherent power of a federal court to sanction. "I As
the United States Supreme Court stated, it is not to be "lightly"

assumed that new procedural rules are intended to depart from
established principles regarding the scope of inherent court power.45
Inherent power may be employed "to achieve the orderly and
39. Of course, there are differences between private and public legal organizations that may necessitate differing approaches to deterrence when sanctions are
considered for comparable misconduct. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 156 cmts. a-b (Preliminary Draft No. 10, 1994)
(discussing differences in goals, legal restraints, and process powers).
40. Discipline of Law Firms, supra note 25, at 636 n.8.
41. Id. at 638. Of course, because clients employing private law firms, in-house
corporate offices, and governmental bodies have different expectations, motivations,
and attorney relationships, reasonableness standards should vary widely between legal
organizations. Even in a single legal organization, reasonable lawyering will vary
widely if different types of clients are represented or if the same client is litigating
several dissimilar lawsuits.
42. Discipline of Law Firms, supra note 25, at 631.
43. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 130-1.1(b) (McKinney 1994) (stating
that a financial sanction may be assessed upon an attorney or "upon a partnership,
firm, corporation, government agency, prosecutor's office, legal aid society or public
defender's office with which the attorney is associated and that has appeared as
attorney of record"); Brignoli v. Balch Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 100,
101 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (indicating that a law firm may be sanctioned for multiplying
proceedings unreasonably and vexatiously (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1927)).
44. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 35 (1991).
45. Id. at 47.
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expeditious disposition of cases" 46 by regulating the conduct of not

only parties, lawyers, and witnesses, but also legal organizations

providing legal services.

B. Adequate Supervision
The recent New York City Bar Association report provides a
good general statement regarding a legal organization's responsibility
for adequately supervising attorneys who present civil litigation

papers:

A law firm shall adequately supervise the work of all partners, associates
and non-lawyers who work at the firm. The degree of supervision required
is that which is reasonable under the circumstances, taking into account
factors such as the experience of the person whose work is being supervised, the amount of work involved in a particular matter and the
likelihood that ethical problems might arise in the course of working on
the matter ....[E]very lawyer's and non-lawyer's work should be supervised to some degree. Depending upon the circumstances, adequate
supervision may include steps such as review of work product [and]
discussion of ...client problems ....I

In applying amended Rule 11, courts should recognize the varying
circumstances under which federal court papers are presented (that
is, signed, filed, submitted, or later advocated).48

Consider a legal organization's duty to supervise those responsible for a complaint that commences a civil action filed in a federal
court. Before the complaint is filed, the legal organization must

supervise its lawyers and nonlawyers alike to make sure that the

complaint is "not being presented for any improper purpose," is
drafted to include "warranted" legal contentions and factual
allegations having a sufficient evidentiary basis, and is formed only
after "an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances." 49 Surely,

what is minimally adequate for an action involving only a few

dollars and no major injunctive relief may be inadequate for a

46. Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962); see also Pagano
v. Rand Materials Handling Equip., 621 N.E.2d 26, 29 (Ili. App. Ct. 1993) (stating
that although a statute foreclosed sanctioning a law firm for the frivolous litigation
papers of its attorney, the "inherent power of a court over all those who appear before
it" allows such a sanction).
47. Discipline of Law Firms, supra note 25, at 638.
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
49. Id.
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multimillion dollar civil action involving alleged sexual abuse by a
well-known member of the clergy or sexual harassment by a highranking government official. For many settings, adequate prefiling
supervision by a legal organization may simply entail the distribution
of copies of professional conduct standards, the distribution of
memos saying, "We need to have compliance," and occasional
meetings at which some "bright young" lawyer talks about the
standards."
In other settings, perhaps two or more attorneys
should be required to inspect certain documents before any filing.5'
After filing, an organization's duty to supervise changes.
Consider how such a duty can be met when an attorney filing a
complaint is subject to a Rule 11 notice of concern about apparent
frivolity. The notice of concern triggers a safe harbor period within
which the challenged complaint should be reexamined and perhaps
amended or withdrawn in order to avoid an assessment of "reasonable expenses and attorneys' fees." 52 A legal organization should
at least have devices in place to help ensure that during the safe
harbor period the signing attorney, the fact investigator, the legal
researcher, and others will stop and reassess before acting again.
On occasion, perhaps more devices would be needed, such as
oversight by an internal review committee of attorneys (and perhaps
others) theretofore not personally involved in the presentation of the
complaint.53
Should the safe harbor period pass and an adversary continue to
challenge a complaint for frivolity by moving for an award of fees
and expenses, adequate supervision seemingly should require
additional action by the responsible legal organization.
The
responsible legal organization must ensure that new steps are taken
that encourage a reassessment of the complaint. The third assessment should differ from the initial and safe harbor steps.

50. George W. Overton, Supervisory Responsibility: A New Ball Game for Law
Firms and Lawyers, 78 ILL. B.J. 434, 436 (1990).
51. Lloyd N. Cutler, The Role of the Private Law Finn, 33 Bus. LAW. 1549,
1550 (1978).
52. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1).
53. An informal survey by the author of all major Illinois law firms (those with
25 or more attorneys) in the Spring of 1994 indicated that few law firms have changed
policy in response to the new Rule 11 (data on file with author).
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C. Appropriate Sanctions
Besides joint responsibility for awards of attorney's fees,
expenses,54 and other monetary directives issued against its lawyers,' 5 what other sanctions may be appropriate for legal organizations that cause Rule 11 violations?56 An array of alternative
sanctions are necessary to encourage a legal organization's adequate
supervision of personnel who present papers. At times, sanctioning
an organization may even be appropriate when "blame" cannot be
assigned to any "particular lawyers."I' A sanction might address
problems with the organization's "ethical infrastructure"-or
"bureaucratic controls""-designed to limit organizational "expo59
sure."
Two forms of sanctions against legal organizations for inadequate supervision seem especially worthy: monetary directives for
which no individual is responsible, and injunctions or, preferably,
admonitions about infrastructure failings that are accompanied by
organizational reforms.
Monetary directives under the new Rule could include "an order
to pay a penalty into court" and "an order directing payment.., of
some or all of the reasonable attorneys' fees and other expenses

54. FED. R. Crv. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
55. While the Rule's acknowledgment of joint law firm "responsibility for
violations committed by its partners, associates and employees" occurs in a provision
that elsewhere speaks only of fees and expenses, id., joint responsibility for other
monetary directives-such as fines payable to the court-would serve the deterrence
function of the Rule, especially given that most monetary directives will involve fines,
id. 11 Advisory Committee's Notes. Of course, should a court not impose joint
responsibility for fines, it might reduce assessments against individual attorneys with
no lessened deterrence resulting.
56. Nonmonetary sanctions against legal organizations were contemplated, though
not implemented, by the federal rulemakers. Supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
Trial courts are expressly authorized to initiate a sanction hearing against a law firm
believed to have violated the Rule. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(B).
57. Schneyer, ProfessionalDisciplinefor Law Firs?,supra note 33, at 8.
58. Id. at 10.
59. Id. at 5. Of course, even two law firms with comparable size, revenues,
clients, and workload can have quite different bureaucratic controls. Firms may have
strong central management (with, for example, a dominant managing partner),
decentralized committee responsibilities, or a more democratic flavor (where no
individual or group assumes much authority).
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incurred as a direct result of the violation."' Fines payable to the
court are preferred, with fees and expenses awarded only when
needed "for effective deterrence" 61-usually occurring in "unusual
circumstances" and involving papers presented for an "improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless
increase in the cost of litigation."'62 District judges will be challenged in using the newly loosened force to issue monetary directives
necessary for effective deterrence of Rule 11 violations by legal
organizations.63
Sanctions involving infrastructure reforms would, as intimated
above, follow judicial review of organizational policies involving
prefiling preparation of litigation papers, responses to an opponent's
notice of concern during a safe harbor period, responses to judicial
initiatives into possible Rule 11 violations, and procedures employed
when an adversary seeks sanctions after a safe harbor period has
run. Typically, the infrastructure addressed by such sanctions might
be described by the organization's policy manual, formal rules, or
established practice in operating committees and allocating responsibilities.' Furthermore, nonmonetary sanctions could encompass an
organization's techniques for training or educating6' its personnel
about Rule 11 or could simply involve "an admonition, reprimand,
or censure" directed at, and circulated within, the organization.66
Given this new responsibility for monitoring litigation practices
of private law firms, corporate legal departments, and United States
Attorney's Offices, and given the lack of transferable judicial
experience elsewhere in assuring that adequate supervision occurs in
law offices, certain comparisons seem helpful for those directing the

60. FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
61. Id.
62. Id. 11(b)(1) Advisory Committee's Notes.
63. One of the possible differences between private and public legal organizations
relevant here is the availability of a sovereign immunity defense.
64. Schneyer, ProfessionalDisciplinefor Law Firms?, supra note 33, at 5.
65. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 Advisory Committee's Notes (indicating that sanctions
may require "participation in seminars or other educational programs").
66. Id. (indicating that admonition, reprimand, and censure are possible
sanctions); see also Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 103 F.R.D.
124, 129 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (discussing the circulation of a sanction order to the
offending lawyer's firm), rev'd on other grounds, 801 F.2d 1531 (9th Cir. 1986).
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newly loosened forces. In particular, federal judges under the new
Rule 11 could look to two arenas.

First, they could examine procedural due process cases involving

the lack of an opportunity for a hearing prior to the deprivation of
life, liberty, or property by some state entity. Absent "extraordinary

situations," 6 7 the United States Supreme Court has held that some
type of predeprivation ,hearing is constitutionally necessary. 8

When losses can be anticipated and avoided without undue burden,

state entities must establish mechanisms that help protect against

such foreseeable harm. These mechanisms are analogous to legal

organizations' supervisory infrastructure. Of course, responsibility
is not unlimited: It has been recognized that these mechanisms
cannot prevent random and unauthorized acts. 69 Similarly, guide-

lines for adequate supervision under Rule 11 could be grounded on
differentiations between feasible supervisory mechanisms and
random and unauthorized acts that cannot be deterred effectively.
Second, federal judges could employ civil rights cases involving
governmental agency failures in hiring and personnel oversight.

While vicarious liability for an individual agent's acts is foreclosed,

67. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-92 (1972) (stating that "truly unusual"
situations include a national war effort, a bank failure, and the risks posed by
misbranded drugs and contaminated food).
68. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971) (stating that "an individual
be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived ... except for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that justifies
postponing the hearing until after the event").
69. As the court said in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981),
The justifications which we have found sufficient to uphold takings
of property without any predeprivation process are applicable to a situation
such as the present one involving a tortious loss of a prisoner's property
as a result of a random and unauthorized act by a state employee. In such
a case, the loss is not a result of some established state procedure and the
State cannot predict precisely when the loss Will occur. It is difficult to
conceive of how the State, could provide a meaningful hearing before the
deprivation takes place. The loss of property, although attributable to the
State... is in almost all cases beyond the control of the State. Indeed, in
most cases it is not only. impracticable, but impossible, to provide a
meaningful hearing before the deprivation. ,
Id. at 541. The Court's rationale regarding state control and procedure remains
unaffected by its later decision in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), in which
the Court overruled Parrattto the extent that it stood for the proposition that mere
negligence by a state official could trigger a due process deprivation. Id. at 329-31.
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liability may still arise when an agency implements a policy
statement, regulation, or some other form of decision officially
adopted by agency officers, or an agency proceeds via a recognized
custom or practice, even though it has not been the subject of formal
approval in the agency's official decisionmaking mechanism.70
Similarly, guidelines for inadequate supervision under Rule 11 could
be based on inquiries into the established formal and informal
policies of legal organizations with respect to civil litigation papers.
IV. Conclusion
With the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 addressing the presentation of frivolous civil litigation papers by legal organizations, federal
rulemakers undertook "radical changes in direction" that loosened
unforeseeable forces. 7 These forces are loose at a time when
similar duties for legal organizations are being debated by the
crafters of professional discipline codes and other lawyer liability
standards. Thus, Rule 11 developments will inform debates in
several arenas.
Rule 11 should now be read to permit sanctions against all legal
organizations, including private law firms, corporate in-house law
offices, and governmental legal departments. Sanctions should be
available when legal organizations fail to adequately supervise
personnel who present litigation papers. To deter frivolous papers,
federal judges should invoke both monetary and nonmonetary
sanctions against legal organizations. If used wisely, Rule 11 thus
provides new and unprecedented opportunities for effective judicial
oversight of the federal litigation practices of legal organizations.
70. Thus, under a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, now in 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1988), the Court in Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436
U.S. 658 (1978) described a governmental unit's civil liability as follows:
We conclude ... that a local government may not be sued under § 1983
for an injury inflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it is
when execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent
official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is
responsible under § 1983.
Id. at 694.
71. Marcus, supra note 5, at 800.

